Maybe; from a research paper I'm working on:
In recent years the political right in the United States and Europe has used comparisons of affluence that show European countries being considerably poorer than the U.S. to gain support for its agenda. According to this line of argument, Europe has been punished with high unemployment and stagnant growth for the excesses of its welfare states (e.g. Meacham & Thomas, 2009). Sweden, home to the world’s largest welfare state, in particular draws the ire of the political right. The Swedish Trade Institute, a right-wing thank based in Stockholm, estimated the nation’s median gross annual household income at roughly $29,000 in the late 1990s, compared to $39,000 in the U.S. at the time (Andersen, 2002). Other publications have claimed that the average Swede has a standard of living lower than that of the average poor American, using statistics such as ownership rates of electronic appliances, GDP per capita and the average square footage of residences as proxies for standard of living. According to these conservative authors, if Sweden does not become more laissez-faire, it is doomed to falling further behind the United States (Bergström & Gidehag, 2004).
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There are many problems with this argument. First of all, the $29,000 figure seems highly suspect. According to official government statistics, the median household income in the UK is about $40,000, and about $55,000 in Switzerland, when adjusted for cost of living (House of Commons, 2006; Swiss Bureau of Statistics, 2003). It seems doubtful that Sweden is so much poorer than the UK or Switzerland given its relatively high GDP per capita. But let’s, for the sake of argument, accept the idea that Sweden’s median household income is far below that of the U.S. Let’s also, for the time being, ignore that Sweden is only one of five Scandinavian countries. Among the most glaring problems in the “Sweden is poorer than the U.S. because of its welfare state” argument is the definition of prosperity. Proponents of the argument use gross annual household income, which does not include the cash and in-kind benefits Swedes get from their welfare state, such as free tertiary education, housing subsidies, free health care, and free child care. Americans spend thousands of dollars out of pocket each year for these services; as mentioned earlies, millions go bankrupt and others even forego necessary medical treatment. Many other Americans (those who can afford it) spend up to thousands each year on private insurance policies, to gain the economic security taken for granted by even the poorest Swedes. Then there is leisure. Swedes are guaranteed five weeks of vacation per year, while most Americans enjoy two or less (Sackery et al., 2008). An accurate comparison of Swedish and American prosperity must take in-kind welfare state benefits, economic security and leisure into account.
Least, but not last, even if we were to continue assuming that Swedes are poorer than Americans, such does not provide an argument against social democracy. The U.S. has had higher levels gross domestic product per capita than Europe since the early 20th century. Perhaps, our head start explains the difference. Most importantly it is a fallacious argument – the presence of A does not necessary cause B. There are several economic developments that would have to be explained before we can come to the conclusion that social democratic welfare states are growth suppressants. If the welfare state truly retards growth, than why have expansions of the welfare state coincided with strong economic growth in both Sweden and the United States? Between 1965 and 1981 the American welfare state grew from 12.3% to 20.7% of GDP, and real GDP grew from $3.1 trillion to $5.3 trillion (in 2000 dollars). In other words, the 68.3% increase in social welfare expenditure as share of GDP, coincided with a 71% increase in real GDP! The next 15 years, on the other hand, saw growth of the American welfare state virtually stagnate and GDP rising by a more modest 59% (Alber, 1988; Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009). In the U.S., the top marginal tax rate is also positively correlated (albeit slightly) with economic growth (figure 3), i.e. over the past fifty years of American history higher taxes on the rich have coincided with more economic growth (figure 4). Last but not least, why have Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden seen an as much GDP growth between 1997 and 2007 as the United States (figure 5)?[1] Why is worker productivity as high or higher in France, Norway and the Netherlands than in the United States, despite their big welfare states? Because, big government simply does not automatically translate into less growth. As Jeff Madrick (2009) has pointed out:
“In sum, America’s productivity is 15 percent higher than the average of
nation’s in the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD)...
But is is lower than in a half dozen nations with much higher taxes and rates of
social spending and roughly half of the OECD countries pay higher or equal wages
to workers in manufacturing, and almost all produce substantially more benefits
than does the United States.” (p. 20).
These data clearly indicate that the conservative argument against the social democratic welfare states is a spurious one. Too often are social democratic welfare states able to match America in regards to productivity and wages, and too often have high taxes and welfare state growth coincided with strong GDP growth in America’s own history. There is simply no conclusive evidence that a social democratic welfare state leads to economic stagnation that eventually hurts everyone. Social democracy, therefore, emerges from the debate with conservatives as a viable alternative to the more laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon model; an alternative American liberals should not be afraid to borrow from.
Figure 3: The top marginal tax rate (pink line with percentages on left y axis) has seems to have little effect on annual nominal GDP growth (blue line with percentages on right y axis).
Figure 4: Slight positive correlation between higher top marginal income tax rate and GDP growth, 1950 - 2005. (Annual GDP growth is on the y-axis and the top marginal tax rate on the x axis). Note that if high taxes levied on the rich were inherently anti-growth, one expect a significant negative correlation over the course of the past 60 years.
Figure 5: GDP growth (1997-2007) in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States using 2000 as base year with a value of 100 (Ekonomifakta, 2009).
[1] Between 1997 and 2007, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States saw an increase in real GDP of 22.4%, 42.5%, 28.3%, 37.3% and 32.9%, respectively (Ekonomifakta, 2009).